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We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental 
policy instruments. We use a static partial equilibrium framework to study different combinations of 
regulatory instruments (taxes, standards…) and enforcement instruments (criminal fine, administrative 
fine…). The firms’ compliance decisions depend on the instrument combination selected by the 
government. The model is used to compare the welfare effects of different instrument combinations 
for the textile industry in Flanders. We find that administrative, implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring costs are important to decide on the necessity of an environmental policy. Moreover, we 
show that emission taxes are not necessarily the most cost-effective instrument. This result holds even 
if we include industry heterogeneity. The decision of whether to pursue an environmental policy or not 
depends crucially on the formulation of an appropriate monitoring and enforcement policy. 
Keywords: K32 Environmental Law, K42 Illegal behaviour and enforcement of law, Q28 
Government policy 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When designing environmental regulation governments face many choices. One of the hardest, 
without a doubt, is the selection of a suitable environmental policy instrument (Bohm and Russell, 
1985). One important consideration is clearly the cost effectiveness of the instruments. Traditionally
2 
market-based instruments, such as emission taxes, are assumed to be more cost efficient than 
command-and-control (CAC) instruments since they equalise marginal abatement costs across firms 
and industries. The influence of monitoring and enforcement costs on the cost effectiveness of 
different instruments, however, is often neglected. Recently, monitoring and enforcement costs have 
been studied extensively in theory and often on a per instrument basis (Cohen, 2000; Heyes, 2001).  
In this paper we aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of 
policy instruments. Malik (1992) already showed that the decision rules for minimising enforcement 
costs and minimising abatement costs are different. Therefore it is not a priori certain that CAC 
policies are more expensive than incentive-based policies when enforcement is taken into account. 
Enforcement and monitoring costs are highly non-linear and depend on the legal system. Therefore we 
use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to one industrial sector (textile industry in 
Flanders). The simple model we use includes abatement decisions and costly  monitoring and 
enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs 
and compliance decisions between firms. For the problem of water pollution in the Flemish textile 
industry we compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and 
technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, administrative fines and 
transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs 
alters indeed the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments
3.  
In the following section we describe the theoretical framework. Next we focus on the assumptions 
underlying the case study. In the fourth section we construct the welfare function for the different 
instrument combinations and discuss the results of the case study. 
 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Using a static partial equilibrium framework we define the behaviour of three types of agents in the 
economy: firms, households and government. Each agent has a specific objective function. The 
environmental regulation and the associated enforcement policy determine the feasible options. The 
problem is one of asymmetric information since the abatement costs are known to the firms but not to 
the regulator.   
For the regulator there are three stages in selecting an environmental policy: the rule-making stage, the 
implementation stage and the enforcement stage (see table 1). This succession of stages is called the 
regulatory chain. In the rule-making stage the regulator chooses how to tackle the pollution problem. 
Discussions with administrations and interest groups are held to decide on the environmental goals and 
on the instruments used to attain those goals. Costs linked to this stage are called rule-making costs 
(RC). In the implementation stage the environmental regulation is in force and in order to ensure its 
correct implementation some extra regulation is needed. Costs linked to this stage are abatement costs 
(AC) and administrative implementation costs (IC). In the enforcement stage compliance with the 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Kolstad (2000). 
3 We do not consider liability rules in this paper.    3
regulation is ensured. A monitoring and enforcement policy is developed. Costs linked to this stage are 
the enforcement costs (EC). For a more detailed study of the legal and administrative process we refer 
to Billiet (2001).  
 
  Description  List of Instruments 
Emission tax 
Emission standard 
Emission standard included in a 
license system 
Emission standard combined with 
an authorising notification duty 
Stage 1 - 
Rule making stage 
The regulator chooses the 
instrument to tackle pollution. 
Discussions with administrations 
and interest groups are held. 
Costs linked to this stage are 
called rule-making costs (RC). 
Technology standard 
Technology standard included in a 
license system 
Technology standard combined 
with authorising notification duty 
Stage 2 -  
Implementation 
stage 
The environmental regulation is 
in force and in order to ensure its 
correct application some extra 
regulation is needed. 
Costs linked to this stage are 





Inspection and maintenance duty 
Stage 3 -  
Enforcement stage 
The compliance with the 
regulation needs to be ensured. A 
monitoring and enforcement 
policy is needed. 
Costs linked to this stage are the 





In each stage an instrument has to be selected. A list of these instruments can be found in table 1. In 
our model we include the following rule making instruments: an emission tax, an emission standard 
and a technology standard. Moreover we discuss three different versions of the emission and 
technology standard: firstly we look purely at the instrument itself, secondly we include the instrument 
in a license system and thirdly we combine the instrument with an authorising notification duty
4. In the 
implementation stage the policy maker can choose among three instruments: a documentation duty
5, a 
                                                 
4 In an ‘authorising notification duty’ system the agent has to report some information to the administration, for 
example, that they have installed a particular filter. This report then automatically allows (‘empowers’) them to, 
for example, continue their business.  
5 A documentation duty asks the firm to have documentation about, for example, its emissions. Nothing has to be 
done with the documents; firms just need to have them.   4
notification duty
6 and an inspection and maintenance duty
7. Finally we also distinguish three 
enforcement instruments: a criminal fine, an administrative fine and a transaction offer
8.  
We now describe the behaviour and objectives of the production sector, the households and the 
government. 
 
1.  Notation 
TCi  Total costs for firm i 
ACi  Abatement costs for firm i 
ICf/h/g  Implementation costs of firms/ households/ government 
ECf/h/g  Enforcement costs of firms/ households/ government 
RCf/h/g  Rule making costs of firms/ households/ government 
pi  Probability of detection of firm i 
Fi  Fine of firm i 
violi  Size of violation of firm i 
suri  Size of firm i's overcompliance with an emission standard 
// esetts p   Penalty parameter associated with emission standard/ emission tax/ 
technology standard 
Ei  Actual emissions of firm i 
R
i E  
Reported emissions of firm i 
A
i E   Abated emissions of firm i 
CS  Consumer surplus 
PS  Producer surplus 
EQ  Environmental quality 
 
2.  Production sector  
In order to concentrate on the choice of instruments and the role of monitoring and enforcement we 
assume that the output of firms is fixed
9. We therefore assume that firms cannot go out of business. 
Once the environmental regulation is implemented the firms have to make at most two decisions. First 
                                                 
6 A notification duty asks the firm to communicate certain information to the administration; e.g. in order to pay 
taxes a firm has to notify the administration of its emissions. 
7 An inspection and maintenance duty asks firms to maintain and test its installation on a regular basis and often, 
by means of officially recognised expert. 
8 A transaction offer is a special kind of administrative fine used in Belgium. Administrative costs are very low 
for this instrument. 
9 Rousseau and Proost (2001a) analysed the general equilibrium effects of enforcement costs on the efficiency of 
different regulatory instruments.   5
firms have to decide whether to comply or not with the regulation. Next they have to decide what 
technology to use. Firms fix automatically the amount of emissions they emit when they decide about 
abatement. In the case of an emission tax, the firm also decides how many emissions they report to the 
administration. We successively discuss three different rule-making instruments: emission standard, 
emission tax and technology standard.  
 
2.1  Emission standard 
Firm  i minimises the expected costs associated with the regulation in force. These costs include 
abatement costs (ACi ), rule-making costs (RCf ), administrative implementation costs (ICf ), expected 
enforcement costs (E(ECf )) and the expected sanction (pi.Fi ). Some of these costs are identical for all 
firms and are marked with the index f.  




























  (1) 
The firm emits Ei and is subject to an emission standard  E. We have written this constraint as an 
equality in order to define slack variables. The variable suri will be positive in case of overcompliance. 
The firm itself does not benefit from this extra emission reduction but through the environmental 
quality improvement society does. The other variable violi indicates if and by how much the firm 
violates the regulation. 
When the firm is violating the environmental policy it faces an expected sanction piFi where pi is the 
inspection frequency and Fi is the fine. This fine depends on the size of the violation and the penalty 
parameter  es p . In section II.4 we look further into the assumptions underlying the monitoring and 
enforcement policy. 
The rule-making, implementation and expected enforcement costs are identical for all firms. These 
costs include, among others, the costs of the firms’ extra administration. Managers need to be 
informed about their legal obligations and the implications for their company. They may need to apply 
for a license. Moreover they need to collect information about the technological possibilities to 
comply with the standard. Some employees may need training. Measurement of emissions is necessary 
to evaluate the compliance status. An example of enforcement costs for firms are the costs of having to 
follow up the inspection and to perform a second test if necessary. A detailed identification and 
estimation of these costs is part of the empirical exercise and will be discussed later. 
 
                                                 
10 We assume that firms are risk neutral. This is no innocent assumption when it comes to enforcement.   6
2.2  Emission tax 























  (2) 
Every year firms that are subject to an emission tax, report a certain amount of emissions 
R
i E  to the 
government. They pay taxes on these reported emissions. However, if a firm reports less than the 
actual amount of emissions, it is in violation and faces a penalty. We define the variable violi as the 
difference between actual and reported emissions. This variable is never negative if the firm behaves 
rationally. Enforcement is discussed more thoroughly in section II.4 
In analogy to the emission standard the rule-making, implementation and expected enforcement costs 
are identical for all firms. Firms now not only face information costs but also the costs for the yearly 
tax report. Data must be collected and reported. Calculations must be made. Moreover, the firm also 
has to perform measurements to know its actual emissions. 
 
2.3  Technology standard 
A technology standard forces the firm to use a particular abatement technology or production process. 
The firm’s choice space is therefore limited. Either they comply with regulations and install the 
technology or they are in violation. Abatement costs are fixed for one company but can differ between 
firms. We allow for firm heterogeneity. 



















  (3) 
The standard fixes one particular technology for each firm. The implementation of this technology can 
lead to different costs for each firm. Each firm has two options: either it complies with the standard 
and installs the technology at cost  i AC  (and violi is zero) or it does not install the technology and 
incurs no costs (and  viol i is one). Notice that the  violi is a binary variable and not expressed in 
emission units. 
Again rule-making, implementation and expected enforcement costs are identical for all firms. Cost 
for information acquisition are limited in size since the regulation already indicates which technology 
must be used. There is no need to know alternatives or even actual emissions. 
 
3.  Households  
The households are treated as a more or less passive agent. We assume that households maximise 
utility: 
  ( ) maxmax() hhh CSRCOCEEC =--- U   (4)   7
We assume that consumer prices are determined on the world market. Therefore local producers and 
consumers do not influence prices. Consequently the consumer surplus will remain constant in our 
model. 
Rule-making costs for households can include the possibility to object to a permit request. 
Administrative implementation costs result from investments in lobbying and information acquisition. 
Expected enforcement costs result from complaining to or warning the appropriate authorities. All 
these costs are considered as fixed but they vary with the instrument selected by the government. 
 
4.  Government 
Government maximises social welfare (SW) and this is expressed as follows: 
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  (5) 
Social welfare comprises producer (PS) and consumer  (CS) surplus, environmental quality  (EQ), 
regulation costs for firms and households and the governmental budgetary surplus corrected with the 
marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). 
In the global welfare function we include all rule-making, implementation and enforcement costs 
associated with a particular set of instruments but also subtract environmental benefits. Environmental 
benefits are subtracted to allow us to deal with the indivisibilities of the abatement costs that make 
comparisons across instruments more difficult (Oates et al., 1989). 
Rule-making costs for the government result from meetings within the administration and with interest 
groups and experts. Governmental operating costs have to do with, for instance, distributing regulatory 
information through official publication of laws and statutes. Enforcement costs include inspection 
and prosecution costs.  
 
5.  Monitoring and enforcement 
The monitoring and enforcement policy is modelled in a simple way and is similar but not identical to 
the one used by Harford (1978) and Malik (1992).  
The probability of inspection is modelled in the following way: 
  01 ii ppviolwith aa =+££   (6) 
Every firm, whether it is violating the environmental regulation or not, will be inspected with a certain 
fixed probability p . A violator, however, faces an extra possibility of being inspected. This probability 
( ) i viol a  is proportional to the level of violation. This does not imply that the agency knows the level 
of violation or even which firms are in violation. It simply represents the practice that every complaint 
is followed up by the environmental inspection agency. The neighbouring community, environmental 
pressure groups or civil servants can issue complaints when they notice something suspicious. We 
assume that complaints are highly correlated with the degree of violation. 
We assume that every violation that is detected leads to a sanction for the violator. The three types of 
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Finally we assume that firms, households and government know the relation between the level of 
violation, the probability of inspection and the sanction. 
For this specification of the monitoring and enforcement policy we can analyse the decision  of the 
firm. We describe the firms’ decision rules that determine whether firms comply with the regulation or 
not. They also indicate which abatement technologies firms install. The rules differ for the different 
instruments. 
 
5.1  Emission tax 
The first-order condition that determine how much emissions (
R
i E ) a firm will report is: 
  ( ) ( )

















  (8) 
with 
O
i E  equal to the firm’s initial emissions before abatement technology has been installed and 
A
i E  
equal to the amount of emissions reduced by abatement. The difference 
OA
ii EE -  is therefore equal to 
the actual emissions of firm i. 
Reported emissions are equal to a fraction B of the firm’s actual emissions as long as the fraction B is 
smaller than one. This fraction depends on the tax rate and the enforcement parameters. Notice that B 
is not firm specific. All firms will report the same fraction of their actual emissions. Firms will never 
report more than there actual emissions. 
Next firms have to decide which technologies they want to install. A firm will invest in a particular 
abatement technology if the investment costs ACi fulfil the following condition: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11
A
ii ACBBpBE tatp Øø £+-+- ºß   (9) 
Firms will invest in abatement if the costs of doing so are smaller than the corresponding decrease in 
taxes paid and expected fine. 
 
5.2  Emission standard 
When an emission standard is in force, the firm will decide to use a particular abatement technology if 
the investment costs fulfil the following condition: 
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It will be optimal to invest in abatement if the reduction in expected fines exceeds investment costs. 
Once the abatement decision is taken, actual emissions are determined and also the degree of firm 
violation. Notice that due to the indivisibilities in the abatement cost function, firms can overcomply 
with the regulation. The extra emission reductions benefit society but not the firms.  
 
5.3  Technology standard 
For a technology standard the compliance decision is simple. A particular technology will be 
implemented if costs fulfil the following condition: 
  ( ) i i ACpAC ap £+   (11) 
A firm will comply with the technology standard if it costs less than the expected fine. This expression 
will lead to a corner solution
11 for the firm.  
 
III.  EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
1.  Benchmark and description 
In order to illustrate our theoretical model we decided to focus on the Flemish textile industry. More 
specifically we concentrate on the water pollution caused by textile improvement and carpet 
production. These two subsectors are after all responsible for most of the water pollution in the sector. 
Several sector studies (PRESTI, 1994-1997; Jacobs et al., 1998; Centexbel, 1996 and OVAM, 1996) 
provide us with useful information. For reasons of tractability we limit our study to water pollution 
caused by BOD
12 emissions and we only consider point sources.  
In our benchmark scenario there is no environmental regulation in place. We do, however, assume that 
all necessary legal and economic institutions are already in place; such as the environmental inspection 
agency, courts, senate…  
Finally the marginal cost of public funds equals 1.2 (Mayeres, 1999) and the willingness to pay for an 
improvement in water quality equals  € 31 per year for each ton of BOD removed (Rousseau and 
Proost, 2001b). We will provide a sensitivity analysis of this estimate. 
 
2.  Selection and specification of the regulatory chain 
When we combine all possible instruments in the three stages we obtain thirty regulatory chains that 
could be of interest (Billiet et al., 2002). For each of these combinations we will consider several 
values for the instruments. By using different values for, for example, the emission tax rate we are able 
to construct a global welfare function defining the costs and benefits connected with a certain emission 
reduction.  
 
                                                 
11 To obtain an internal solution it suffices to make the penalty additive instead of multiplicative. 
12 Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) is after all the standard measure of pollution (Helland, 1998).   10 
3.  Monitoring and enforcement parameters 
We assume that the fixed inspection probability  p is equal to 0.1
13. Next we assume that the variable 
inspection parameter a is equal to 0.5. The probability of inspection is therefore proportional to the 
size of the violation. 
Finally we assume that the penalty parameter p is equal to 2. In Billiet (2001) we find that in Belgium 
the penalty for evading an emission tax is typically twice the evaded amount. Since we have no 
information on the other instruments, we use the same number for the penalty parameter. 
In section IV we perform a sensitivity analysis on these parameters. 
 
4.  Abatement cost function 
Explicitly modelling the firms’ heterogeneity is important to capture the advantages of market-based 
versus command-and-control instruments. Therefore we made use of a firm level survey on abatement 
costs. We first contacted by mail 106 Flemish companies active in textile improvement and carpet 
production. Then we conducted a follow-up interview on site. We obtained useful cost estimates from 
20 firms. We asked firms to state the costs of presently installed abatement technologies and of 
planned investment in the next two years. These data were used to estimate abatement cost functions 
for each company in order to represent firms’ heterogeneity. In appendix A we give a summary of the 
cost estimates we obtained. 
The cost estimates take both fixed and variable costs into account. We include initial investment costs, 
subsidies, personnel, energy and other costs. The life span of an investment is assumed to be 20 years. 
We assign all costs to only one pollutant, i.e. BOD, and therefore assume that the sole purpose of the 
investment is to reduce BOD emissions
14. After calculating the net present value (NPV) of each 
technology we derive the associated annuities and use these in the model. 
An extensive range of technologies was reported including filters, use of different inputs and 
wastewater treatment. Cost differences of abatement technologies between firms turn out to be large 
indeed; cost estimates (NPV) for one particular technology ranged from 1 million € in one firm to 4.7 
million € in another firm.  
 
5.  Rule-making, implementation and enforcement costs 
We identify fixed cost factors that result from the legal context and from the instrument itself (see 
Billiet et al., 2002). The cost factors resulting from the legal context are: 
-  guarantees required for civil rights; 
-  guarantees required for criminal pursuits; 
-  the possibility that an instrument is unavailable for a particular legislator; 
-  uncertainty about the competency status of an instrument or a variation thereof; 
                                                 
13 This value is based on a press release from the Ministry of the Flemish Community on 11 June 2001. We read 
‘… that every class-I-firm is inspected thoroughly not even once every ten year’.  Since we only consider class-I-
firms we can assume that every firm regardless of its compliance status has a ten percent probability of being 
inspected per year. 
14 In reality investments in abatement technologies often serve multiple purpose and reduce the output of several 
pollutants. This means that firms can ‘overachieve’ and do better than legally required. One way to deal with this 
overachievement problem can be found in Oates et al. (1989). In this paper, we make abstraction of this.   11 
-  dysfunctional structure of the instrument due to limitations in the division of competencies 
among government levels; 
-  structural susceptibility of the instruments for violations of the equality principle or the 
discrimination injunction 
The cost factors resulting from the instrument itself are: 
-  administrative sustainability 
-  technical content (environmental and legal) 
-  knowability 
-  rules which require a procedure to be implemented 
-  legal formalisation 
-  time profile in the implementation stage 
-  rules which require an administration as implementation partner 
-  flexibility 
-  clustering  
For each of these cost factors we have performed a relative valuation (see table 2) per instrument and 
per agent; and we haven taken into account the different stages of the regulatory chain. We include a 
wide variety of costs: the costs of lobbying, of filling in forms, of communicating with the 
administration, of performing inspections, of internal meetings, of legal counselling…  
 
  Government  Households  Firms 
Instrument  RC  IC  EC  RC  IC  EC  RC  IC  EC 
Emission standard  105  2+print  2.5  0.5    1  1  15 + lab  3.5 
Authorising notification 
duty 
35  0.5  0.5          1   
License system  137  35  3  0.5  0.5  0.5  2.5  26.5  1 
Emission tax  133  6+print  5  0.5      1  20  8 
Technology standard  75  2+print  2.5  0.25    0.5  1  8.5  1 
Documentation duty  17  0.5  1.5          7   
Notification duty 1  15.5  0.5            0.25   
Notification duty 2  18.5+print  4.5+print  1.25          4.25  0.75 
Testing duty  15.5                 
Criminal fine  33  34      7.75      39   
Civil fine  62.5  65    0.25      0.25  13   
Transaction offer  63.5  2            1.25   
Table 2: Rule-making, implementation and enforcement costs (in man-days) 
The enforcement, inspection and information costs were estimated using the same firm survey, by 
checking court rulings and by interviewing experts in the administration and in the law profession. The 
results are summarised in  Table 2. An example of the cost breakdown for the emission tax can be 
found in appendix B. 
The relative cost differences between the different instruments is what counts in this analysis. We do 
not want to stress the absolute values of these cost estimates. Therefore we have expressed the costs in   12 
man-days rather than in monetary terms. However, in order to calculate welfare effects we will need a 
monetary estimate of these costs. We have chosen an average gross wage level
15 in the textile industry 
of 37 €/hour. The average gross wage in the civil sector is assumed to be 50 €/hour. The value of time 
to the households is assumed to be on average 25 €/hour. The costs of analysing a sample in the lab 
are assumed to be € 372 on average. The costs of printing the regulatory information are assumed to 
be € 12395. 
These costs are not used as such in the model. We have estimated and taken into account how often a 
particular instrument is used or changed by government, how often firms are punished for being in 
violation, etc. Costs associated with an emission tax are incurred each year and are, therefore, taken 
completely into account. Costs associated with an emission standard, on the contrary, are assumed to 
occur every four years and we, therefore, use the figure in table 2 divided by five (remember that we 
look at a time period of 20 years). Costs associated with inspections depend on the number of 
inspections performed.  
 
IV.  RESULTS 
1.  Base scenario  
First we plot in Figure 1 the welfare effects and emission levels for one instrument combination, i.e. an 
emission tax combined with a documentation duty, a notification duty and a transaction offer. We 
consider the effect of implementing different tax rates. 
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Figure 1 
                                                 
15 This amount is based on the answers obtained when we questioned the textile firms.   13 
BOD emissions reduce stepwise with an increasing tax rate because of the indivisibilities included via 
the abatement cost curves (see  Figure 1). It is only profitable to invest in a particular abatement 
technology when the tax rate exceeds a certain level. The abatement cost function is therefore not 
continuous. Due to the same reason the welfare level changes stepwise. Once the tax rate exceeds a 
threshold value, the welfare level jump up only to slowly decline until another threshold is exceeded. 
This decline is caused by the increase in costs without a compensating decrease in emissions. 
In order to provide some insight in the relative impact of the regulatory costs on social welfare, we 
give in Table 3 the rule-making, implementation (including abatement costs) and enforcement costs 
for the three different agents as a percentage of social welfare. It is clear from this table that the costs 
are substantial in absolute values but are less important relative to social welfare. 
 
Instrument  Specification  Emissions 
(in ton BOD) 
Social welfare 
(   in K Euro) 
Costs 
(RC+IC+EC+AC as % of SW) 
Firm  2.03066 
Citizen  2.27372 
Emission tax  0.0025 €/kg BOD  13 138 316  872 205 
Government  0.03934 
Firm  3.90443 
Citizen  1.35964 
Emission 
standard 
250 mg BOD/l  13 336 982  875 148 
Government  0.00923 
Firm  10.57977 
Citizen  0.90191 
Technology 
standard 
WZI  13 883 376  824 558 
government  0.00667 
Table 3 
Completely in line with existing literature, costs for firms are highest with a technology standard and 
lowest with an emission standard. Costs for citizens are relatively high since many households are 
affected by the regulation. Differences between citizens’ costs over the different instruments are due to 
our assumptions concerning the instruments’ durability
16. 
 
In the base scenario we exclude environmental benefits. A sensitivity analysis will check the influence 
of environmental benefits on the results. In Figure 2 we plot the welfare effect for all instruments 
combined with a transaction offer. In the figure we measure the emission level on the horizontal axis 
and the welfare level on the vertical axis. We immediately see that a certain amount of rest emissions 
(namely 5
  563
  192 ton BOD) will persist whatever firms or government do. This is due to our 
assumption that the industry’s output remains fixed. 
                                                 
16 We assume that emission taxes are adapted yearly while emission standards are only adapted every four years 
and technology standards every five years.   14 
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Figure 3 
                                                 
17 Abbreviations are: emission tax (Tax), emission standard version 1 or 2 (ES 1/2) and technology standard (TS).   15 
In Figure 3 we compare the different sanctioning instruments for an emission tax. The criminal fine is 
by far the most expensive instrument to use and, as could be expected, the transaction offer is the 
cheapest to use. However, in reality these three instruments are often used as complements. For minor 
violations or first time offenders, a transaction offer will often suffice. A criminal fine will be used for 
serious violations or extremely uncooperative firms. The administrative fine also has its specific use. 
Using an administrative fine avoids the social stigma associated with criminal fines. Therefore we 
cannot a priori choose one of the enforcement instruments as being ’the best’. We need a dynamic 
model to study the power of this type of strategies more closely. An example of a model that punishes 
repeat offenders more severely is Harrington (1988). 




















































emission standard 1 ES1 with license system ES1 with authorising notification duty
 
Figure 4 
We compare three different versions of the emission standard in  Figure 4. Adding an authorising 
notification duty to a standard only minimally increases the associated costs. Including the standard in 
a license system, on the contrary, markedly increases costs. We cannot say as such which formula the 
regulator should use since other criteria, besides costs, can play a role.  
 
2.  Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis shows that the results are – in certain aspects - highly sensitive to the differences 
in the willingness to pay (WTP) for water quality improvements. The higher the WTP f or the 
improvement in environmental quality, the more it pays to pursue an environmental policy even if the 
emissions are only minimally reduced.  
See for example Figure 5 for the welfare curves associated with three different level of WTP for the 
emission tax combined with a transaction offer. Remarkable is that the changes in WTP do not 
influence the relative position of the different instruments. This implies that the result of Oates et al. 
(1989) do not carry through in our model.   16 
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Figure 5 
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the enforcement parameters (fixed inspection probability, 
coefficient of the variable inspection probability and the penalty coefficient) shows their immense 
importance. When the enforcement parameters are at a suboptimal level, it may be that is more cost 
effective not to have environmental regulation at all.  
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Figure 6 
In Figure 6 we have plotted the change in welfare and emission reduction for one particular tax rate  
( 0.001€/kgBOD t = ) when the fixed inspection frequency  i p  changes from zero to one. An 
optimum is reached for a fixed inspection frequency equal to 0.2. The importance of correctly   17 
selecting this parameter is illustrated by this figure. Reducing the parameter from 20% to 10% 
decreases welfare with approximately 74 million Euros.  
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Figure 7 
In Figure 7 we perform the same exercise for the variable inspection parameter a. Again an optimum 
can be reached, namely for a equal to 0.6. Tests have shown us that both inspection parameters  (fixed 
inspection frequency and variable inspection parameter) influence each other. In order to optimise the 
inspection policy, government will have to fix both parameters simultaneously. This surely is an 
exercise worth doing since welfare can increase considerably. 
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Figure 8   18 
Finally we perform the same exercise for the penalty parameter p
18. One immediately sees that the 
penalty greatly influences the outcome: resulting emissions range from 37,1 million to 18,1 million ton 
BOD. Welfare levels range form 175 million to 735 million Euros. The penalty can be used as 
substitute for a higher tax up to a certain point. Manipulating the penalty cannot achieve the same 
emission reduction as manipulating the tax rate b eyond the limit of 18.1 million ton BOD for this 
specification. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The global welfare functions associated with each regulatory chain lead us to six key observations. 
1.  First, in order to obtain a given emission reduction, the technology standard turns out to be the 
most expensive instrument. Moreover, the use of this instrument is extremely limited since it can 
only reach as many levels of emission reductions as there are abatement technologies and the 
obtained result is highly sensitive to changes in the monitoring and enforcement parameters. 
2.  Identifying the instrument that leads to the highest welfare level was less clear-cut. The welfare 
curves for emission standard and emission tax cross each other several times. We can nevertheless 
say that an emission standard is less costly than an emission tax for most of the emission reduction 
levels. These results are also sensitive to changes in the monitoring and enforcement parameters 
and to the emission tax procedure used in Belgian environmental law.  
3.  Further we compared three different versions of the emission and technology standard. Adding an 
authorising notification duty to a standard only minimally increases the associated costs. Including 
the standard in a license system, on the contrary, markedly increases costs.  
4.  The criminal fine is by far the most expensive sanctioning instrument to use and, as could be 
expected, the transaction offer is the cheapest to use. However, in reality these three instruments 
are often used as complements. For minor violations or first time offenders, a transaction offer will 
often suffice. A criminal fine will be used for serious violations or extremely uncooperative firms. 
The administrative fine also has its specific use. Therefore we cannot a priori choose one of the 
enforcement instruments as being ’the best’.  
5.  Sensitivity analysis shows that the results are  – in certain aspects  - highly sensitive to the 
differences in the willingness to pay (WTP) for water quality improvements. The higher the WTP 
for the improvement in environmental quality, the more it pays to pursue an environmental policy 
even if emissions are only minimally reduced. Remarkably the changes in WTP do not influence 
the relative position of the different instruments.  
6.  Sensitivity analysis with respect to the enforcement parameters (fixed inspection probability, 
coefficient of the variable inspection probability and the penalty coefficient) shows their immense 
importance. Choosing the optimal level of the parameters is crucial to the decision of the 
appropriateness of environmental regulation. Changing the level of the parameters can suddenly 
make a policy worthwhile pursuing. 
In conclusion we can say that adding a detailed identification and estimation of information, 
monitoring and enforcement costs linked to an environmental policy, can greatly change traditional 
results with respect to the relative efficiency of instruments. Our numerical illustration proves this 
                                                 
18 We assume that every penalty parameter  ,, esetts ppp  is equal to 2. For short we refer to the penalty parameter 
as p in the rest of the text.   19 
point by showing how an emission tax can be the most expensive instrument to use in order to obtain a 
particular level of environmental quality. This result holds even if we include heterogeneity of the 
industry into our model. 
Moreover we have also shown that it is important to use a correct estimate of the willingness to pay 
for environmental quality improvements but that it is even more important to formulate an appropriate 
monitoring and enforcement policy. The decision of whether to pursue an environmental policy or not 
depends on it. 
  
APPENDIX A – Abatement cost estimates 
To guarantee anonymity of the participating firms we did not explicitly name technologies and firms. 
 
Firm  Technology  NPV (in €)  BOD COD
19  Other chemicals  Water 
A  T1  3 168 402    X  caprolactam   
 T2  354 113         
B  T1  1 051 470  X  X     
 T3  24 789      Latex    
 T4  12 394 676        X 
 T5  9 916        X 
C  T6  191 326        X 
D  T7  1 859 201  X  X  N, Zn, Ni, Cr   
 T8  371 840    X  metals, salts, colour   
 T9  421 419    X  metals, salts, colour   
E  T10  49 579        X 
 T5  718 891         
 T11   463 395  (X)
20  (X)     
F  T13  1 983        X 
 T12   -111 159  (X)  (X)  Latex    
H  T13  2 220        X 
 T14  20 035         
 T15  103 650  X  X     
 T12  133 570  X  X     
 T16  10 018        X 
 T17  80 142  (X)  (X)     
 T18  66 785        X 
I  T23  339 823      SS   
J  T24  294 459        X 
 T13  5 404        X 
 T18  49579        X 
 T25  3 470 509        X 
 T26  1 611 308        X 
 T12  594 944  X  X     
 T19  1 363 414  (X)  (X)  (Metals, SS)   
                                                 
19 Chemical oxygen demand  
20 (.) = estimate, not based on data obtained from that firm but analogue to other companies   20 
K  T1  4 719 663  X  X  N, Ni   
 T12  495 787
21  (X)  (X)     
L  T1  1 090 393  X  X  SS   
 T21  347 051  (X)  (X)     
M  T3   358 869  X  X  SS, Zn   
 T20  9 916         
 T27  -21 625      SS, Zn   
 T11  495 787  X  X  SS, Zn   
 T28  19 794        X 
N  T13  4 958        X 
 T19  371 840  (X)  (X)  (Metals, SS)   
 T12  88 081  (X)  (X)     
O  T29  123 947      Fibres   
 T3   1 050 737      Fibres, latex    
 T22  366 512      Inputs  X 
 T13  992        X 
 T23  149 000      Inputs  X 
P  T1  2 133 371  X  X  SS, N, F, Metals   
 T18  47 959        X 
 T30  495 787        X 
R  T3  1 687 658    X  Zn, Mangaan   
S  T31  12 870      latex   X 
T  T32  -75 618  (X)  (X)     
 T33  199 346         
U  T11  37 184  (X)  X     
 T19  1 041 153  X  X  (Metals, SS)   
 T16  195 787        X 
V  T34  71 702         
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21 ___ = estimate of costs analogue to other companies 
22 The declaration of the tax is not taken into account. It is captured in the notification duty. 
23 Control and enforcement are difficult to implement since one has to work backward in time (for the past year).   21 
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